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The possibility that individuals may derive utility from the mere fact of holding wealth has long been
recognized. A simple intertemporal model featuring utility from accumulation is used here to examine
consumption and savings, the choice between inter vivos gifts and bequests (both to descendants and
to charities), and levels of annuitization. Introducing utility from accumulation helps to explain a number
of empirical regularities that otherwise seem inconsistent with optimizing behavior. Moreover, because
individuals who derive significant utility from accumulation will tend to save more and, in the long
run, give more than others do, this source of utility may be especially important in analyzing savings
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1Different explanations for utility from accumulation may have different normative implications, but the
present discussion is confined to positive analysis.
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1.  Introduction
It is familiar that individuals might derive utility from accumulation, that is, from the
possession (in contrast to the expenditure) of wealth.  See, for example, Weber (1930) and Pigou
(1941).  The benefits may be internal (peace of mind, a sense of success) or external (status,
power).  Another possibility is that individuals merely behave as if there is utility from
accumulation, due perhaps to evolutionary imperatives or habits developed during working years
that persist through retirement.
1  Utility from accumulation may help to explain the existence of
misers, of high-ability individuals who continue working longer and harder than seems to be
justified by needs for future consumption or bequest motives, and, relatedly, of people who view
their wealth more as a measure of success (a way of keeping score) than as a means to more
tangible ends.
In light of these motivations, it is not surprising that various modern literatures explore
the possibility that individuals derive utility from wealth, relative wealth, or the anticipation of
future consumption.  Most notable has been some work on risk premiums, asset pricing, and
growth.  See, for example, Kurz (1968), Bakshi and Chen (1996), Gong and Zou (2002), and
Kuznitz, Kandel, and Vyacheslav (2008).  More closely related is Carroll’s (2000) discussion of
why some of the rich save more than the life-cycle model predicts.  Greater attention to utility
from accumulation can also be seen as part of a broader recent effort to incorporate alternative
behavioral hypotheses in economic models, both generally and in public economics in particular. 
On the latter, see Bernheim (2002) and Bernheim and Rangel (2007).
The present investigation incorporates utility from accumulation in an intertemporal
model in order to examine effects on consumption, savings, inter vivos gifts and bequests (both
to descendants and to charities), and annuitization.  It is natural to explore these relationships. 
Moreover, in these areas there are empirical regularities that seem difficult to explain using
conventional models.  For example, many argue that individuals with significant wealth
accumulations do not dissave at a sufficiently high rate during retirement.  For a survey and
analysis of competing views, see Hurd (1990).  In choosing between inter vivos gifts and
bequests to descendants, individuals seem to do far too little of the former in light of the
potential estate tax savings.  See Joulfaian and McGarry (2004) and Poterba (2001).  The
magnitude of charitable bequests (versus inter vivos contributions) also seems puzzling in light
of tax considerations.  More broadly, patterns of bequests have proved difficult to explain.  See,
for example, Bernheim’s (2002) survey.  And individuals do not appear to annuitize as much as
is optimal.  See, for example, Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond (2005).  Perhaps utility from
accumulation would help to explain some of these phenomena.  In addition, because those who
obtain significant utility from accumulation will save and bequeath more than others do, these
individuals may be disproportionately important in understanding the pertinent behaviors.
Section 2 presents the model, analyzes individuals’ optimizing behavior, and derives
results regarding the effects of utility from accumulation.  Section 3 relates these findings to
observed behavior.Uaccum5.wpd  December 15, 2009
2The form of annuity contract in the model here is the same as that in Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond
(2005), although in their two-period model this contract is equivalent to a conventional annuity.
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2.  Analysis
Individuals’ expected utility is given by
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The probability pi is the likelihood of being alive in period i.  The pi’s are nonincreasing; it is
natural to take p1 = 1, and one can place a finite limit T on the possible length of life by setting
pT+1 = 0.  In each period i, individuals derive utility from their current consumption, ci, from
current (inter vivos) gifts, gi, from their currently held (to the end of the period) accumulation of
wealth, wi, and, if they die at the end of the period, from their bequest of that wealth.  Both gifts
and bequests may be interpreted as transfers to descendants or to charities.  The derivatives UN,
GN, VN, and BN are positive, and UO, GO, VO, and BO are negative.  The nonnegative weight α on
V is introduced for later comparative statics regarding the magnitude of utility from
accumulation.
Individuals have initial wealth w0.  In each period, wealth may be spent on current
consumption, ci, current gifts, gi, or a current one-period-forward annuity, ai, or wealth may
simply be held over for the next period (which becomes a bequest should an individual die at the
end of the period).  Each dollar spent on period i’s annuity yields πi =  pi/pi+1(1+δ) of additional
wealth in the next period, where δ $ 0 is a loading factor.  (Note that conventional annuities,
under which a current premium is paid to finance a constant future stream conditional on
remaining alive, can be constructed by a series of such one-period instruments.
2)  Accordingly,
in (at the end of) any period t, wealth is given by
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(For t = 1, the final term may be ignored; equivalently, we could define a0 = 0 and begin the
latter summation at i = 0.)  All choice variables, ci, gi, and ai, as well as the level of wealth in
each period, wi, are constrained to be nonnegative, although only interior solutions with positive
values are considered.  All monetary values are expressed in real, time 0 dollars (which
simplifies exposition by allowing notation for interest to be omitted). 
Because choices of ci, gi, and ai in each period affect all future periods by influencing
wealth, it is helpful to state an expected utility function for each period going forward:
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where  indicates the maximized value of subsequent expected utility, beginning in period Zt1
*
t+1, where an individual enters that period with initial wealth of wt and also the gross return from
the prior period’s annuity, πtat.  Thus, in any period t, raising either current consumption, ct, or
current gifts, gi, raises current utility but reduces future wealth and thus subsequent periods’
utility.  Raising the period annuity, at, reduces wt and thus lowers both the current utility from
accumulation and also the utility from bequests (if the individual were to die at the conclusion of
that period), but it also raises subsequent periods’ utility (relative to the alternative of saving)
because the gross return πtat exceeds the cost of the annuity at.  (In cases of interest, πi > 1,
keeping in mind that the alternative to period annuities of ordinary savings is always available.) 
This is the standard benefit of an annuity: conditional on survival, one has more disposable
wealth available in the next period, compared to the alternative of (precautionary) savings.
From expression (3), the first-order conditions for each period t are as follows:
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From conditions (4) and (5), it is immediate that
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That is, in allocating resources between current consumption and current gifts, the marginal
utility of the two will be equated.  One can also combine conditions (4) and (6) to yield
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This expression captures the margin of reducing current consumption to finance a greater
annuity (rather than reducing wealth holdings to do so, as stated initially and captured by
condition (6)).
It will prove useful below to introduce a further implication of individuals’ optimization
that links choices across periods.  In particular, it is possible for an individual in any period j to
reduce consumption by a dollar and use the proceeds to finance a series of annuities that
ultimately increases consumption in period k.  Assuming that all of the proceeds of each
increment to the one-period annuity are used in the next period to purchase additional annuitiesUaccum5.wpd  December 15, 2009
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so as to move funds to the subsequent period, and so on until period k, this modification has no
other effects on utility.  (In particular, wealth in each period is unchanged.)  Since the only
effects on utility are due to changes in consumption in periods j and k, the corresponding
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The second line of expression (9) follows from the definition of πi and indicates the familiar
notion that optimal annuitization equates the marginal utility of consumption across periods, but
only incompletely to the extent of loading costs.
It is now possible to identify the effects on individuals’ optimization of changes in the
importance of utility from accumulation by differentiating the pertinent first-order conditions
with respect to α.  From condition (7), it follows that
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Accordingly, the direction of the change in consumption and gifts within each period must be the
same.  Differentiating condition (9) gives
() ( ) , .






for all j k j
j kj
k





This expression indicates that consumption must change in the same direction in all periods. 
Combined with expression (10), the implication is that both consumption and gifts in all periods
move in the same direction as α is changed.
To determine the effect on at, we can differentiate condition (8) with respect to α (bearing




consumption, gifts, and annuities through period t, and also directly on α, which weights each
period’s marginal utility from accumulation from period t+1 forward).  When this is done and
terms are rearranged, the result is
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3In a two-period model, take the extreme case in which there is no utility from gifts or bequests and in
which either V1 or V2 is set equal to zero; remaining functions are the log of their arguments.  Furthermore, let p1 = 1,
p2 = 0.5, and δ = 0.  One can show that da1/dα > 0 when V1 = 0 whereas da1/dα < 0 when V2 = 0.  In the former case,
the only effect of raising α is to increase the value of remaining wealth in period 2, which wealth is increasing in
annuitization.  In the latter case, the only effect of raising α is to increase the value of unannuitized wealth from
period 1.
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Before proceeding with the interpretation of expression (12), it is helpful to use this
expression for the case in which t = 1 to show that raising α unambiguously reduces
consumption and gifts in every period.  Supposing otherwise, it follows from expressions (10)
and (11) that consumption and gifts rise (or stay the same) in each period.  Therefore, the
numerator on the right side of expression (12) is negative, as is the denominator.  (The term





On the left side of (12), we have, for t = 1, just the single term (π1 ! 1)(da1/dα), so a1 must rise as
well.  Accordingly, w1 falls.  This fact combined with the stipulated increase in α implies that the
magnitude of the first term in expression (6), the first-order condition for the annuity, rises,




(all for t = 1).  This, in turn, means that c1 falls, a contradiction with the maintained hypothesis. 
Hence, we can conclude that, indeed, raising α reduces consumption and gifts in all periods.
Returning to expression (12), this conclusion indicates that the first two terms in the
numerator on the right side are positive.  Since the third term is negative, the effect of raising α
on the level of annuitization is ambiguous.  (To confirm that the effect is ambiguous rather than
merely difficult to sign, examples of each possibility are suggested in the margin; in the
examples, greater annuitization is favored when utility from accumulation arises only in the later
period of a two-period model, whereas less annuitization is favored when utility from
accumulation arises only in the earlier period.
3)
The intuition is as follows.  The first term derives from the left side of expression (8):
since consumption in period t falls, the marginal utility of consumption in that period, UtN, rises;




ceteris paribus, has this effect.  The second term on the right side of expression (12) indicates
that, because both consumption and gifts in all prior periods are lower and thus wealth entering
period t+1 is higher on this account, the marginal return to additional wealth (as may also be
provided by more annuitization in preceding periods) is lower, which makes the optimal level of
annuities before period t+1 fall.  On the other hand, because the direct effect of raising α is to
raise the utility from accumulation in all periods from t+1 forward, the marginal return to




as α is increased, so there is less need for prior-period annuities to fall, and it may even be
optimal for them to increase.  Finally, the summation on the left side of expression (12) captures
the fact that annuities in all prior periods yield a greater return relative to savings, conditional
upon reaching period t alive.Uaccum5.wpd  December 15, 2009
4To some extent, the use of bequests may be explained by individuals’ unwillingness to face death. 
However, for high-wealth individuals who engage in elaborate estate planning, this reason seems insufficient. 
Poterba (2001) considers a number of other possible explanations for the low level of inter vivos giving, and he
largely finds them to be implausible, but he does not consider utility from accumulation.
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In summary, raising α increases the direct return to having more wealth to hold due to the
utility from accumulation, and thus to annuitizing in prior periods, but raising α reduces the
marginal return to wealth because the higher α also induces a reduction in consumption and gifts
that leaves more wealth before any adjustment in the level of annuities is made (and raising α
also raises the target marginal return because UtN rises).  Accordingly, we can state: 
Proposition: As the utility from accumulation, α, rises,
(a) consumption in each period falls,
(b) inter vivos giving in each period falls, and 
(b) annuities purchased in each period may fall or rise.
3.  Interpretation
It is useful to relate these results regarding utility from accumulation to empirical
regularities that have otherwise been difficult to explain.  The first implication of utility from
accumulation is that consumption falls in all periods.  As noted in the introduction, many have
argued that, during retirement years, individuals do not appear to consume their accumulated
wealth at as high a rate as standard theory predicts they should.  If utility from accumulation
during retirement years is important, however, this behavior is more plausible.
Second, the presence of utility from accumulation reduces inter vivos gifts.  Since
consumption is also reduced, the overall implication is not that individuals give less overall but
rather that more in aggregate is ultimately transferred to others and that transfers are more in the
form of bequests than is predicted by standard theory.  This result is consistent with three
difficult-to-explain phenomena.  First, bequests seem to be greater than most explanations
predict.  Second, as previously mentioned, individuals subject to estate taxation seem to rely far
less on inter vivos giving to descendants than maximizing behavior would suggest.
4  Finally, and
related, the same analysis is applicable to charitable giving.  Although charitable giving is
exempt from both gift and estate taxation, which makes the transfer tax system neutral regarding
the timing of gifts, there is a substantial income tax incentive to give during one’s lifetime. 
Specifically, inter vivos charitable gifts generate full tax deductions against ordinary income,
whereas this deduction is sacrificed when transfers occur at death.  Furthermore, the practice of
deferring private transfers and charitable gifts until the time of death seems all the more
surprising in the absence of utility from accumulation when one considers the additional utility
advantages of inter vivos giving over bequests: the ability to experience various benefits while
still alive, including the joy of observing descendants or charitable beneficiaries make use of the
gifts and the praise or status one may receive, and also the fact that earlier gifts may be more
valuable to recipients (children may benefit more from gifts that fund home purchases,
entrepreneurship, or simple consumption during early-adult years when they are liquidity
constrained than in later years, when bequests are typically received).
These points about giving are reinforced when one considers the forms in whichUaccum5.wpd  December 15, 2009
5Modifying the model so that annuitization does not reduce perceived wealth in determining utility from
accumulation (formally, making V a function of wt + at) does not dramatically affect these results.  The two
competing effects are still present, although the relative weights differ.
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substantial inter vivos gifts often are made.  For descendants, trusts are frequently employed. 
For philanthropic transfers, there are trusts, private foundations, and other devices.  Although
there are a variety of reasons donors may wish to maintain some control, another benefit of these
instruments is that donors still feel some sense of ownership of the assets, perhaps generating a
degree of continued utility from accumulation.  In the absence of such mechanisms, inter vivos
gifts may well be even lower than the current, seemingly depressed levels.
Third, utility from accumulation has an ambiguous effect on annuities.  One might have
expected annuitization to fall since, in the present formulation of the utility function, the value of
annuities is not assumed to generate utility from accumulation.
5  Moreover, since consumption
and inter vivos giving fall, there would appear to be less need to annuitize to maintain
consumption levels in the future.  It was seen, however, that there is a countervailing effect,
namely, that annuitization increases effective wealth in future periods, conditional on survival,
so future wealth – a source of subsequent utility from accumulation – need not be spent down as
much to finance consumption.  Perhaps as an empirical matter, this latter effect is secondary. 
Alternatively, if current utility from accumulation is high but future utility from accumulation is
not, annuitization would tend to be lower.  Accordingly, utility from accumulation might
contribute to attempts to explain low levels of annuitization.  See Davidoff, Brown, and
Diamond (2005), who argue that conventional theories seem insufficient to explain minimal
annuitization and also suggest that answers may be found in alternative, psychological theories.
One suspects that the relative importance of utility from accumulation varies across
individuals.  Such variation would help to account for the large, difficult-to-explain
heterogeneity in savings behavior.  See Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg (2001) and Venti and
Wise (1998).  A further implication is that, at any point in time, the behavior of those with
substantial wealth may be disproportionately governed by a model with utility from
accumulation since individuals subject to this phenomenon will as a consequence hold more
wealth than others do.  Furthermore, although outside the present model, those with stronger
utility from accumulation will be motivated to work harder, which will additionally contribute to
their holding above-average wealth.  Therefore, even if utility from accumulation is far from
universal, it may be disproportionately important in understanding overall savings behavior as
well as giving and bequests, both to descendants and to charities.
Although the present focus is on positive analysis, utility from accumulation may have
normative significance as well.  Different explanations of savings and giving behavior seem
potentially relevant to capital taxation, estate and gift taxation, and policies relating to retirement
savings, including social security.  Regarding estate taxation in particular, if bequests consist
substantially of wealth that was accumulated because such accumulation directly produced
utility (rather than primarily because it produced anticipatory utility from transferring it to
descendants or charities), the case for estate taxation may be stronger, just as it is regarded to be
to the extent that bequests are accidental.  Note that, in the present model, the assumption that
πt > 1 implies that annuitization would be complete if there were no bequest motive or utilityUaccum5.wpd  December 15, 2009
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from accumulation, in which case there would be no accidental bequests.  See the first-order
condition (6), which indicates a corner solution in this case.  As is apparent from that same
condition, introducing positive utility from accumulation can restore an interior solution of
incomplete annuitization, which gives rise to accidental bequests: individuals choose not to fully
annuitize in order to hold wealth that yields utility from accumulation.Uaccum5.wpd  December 15, 2009
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